In this paper, we establish the existence of teamoptimal policies for static teams and a class of sequential dynamic teams. We first consider the static team problems and show the existence of optimal policies under certain regularity conditions on the observation channels by introducing a topology on the set of policies. Then, we consider sequential dynamic teams and establish the existence of an optimal policy via the static reduction method of Witsenhausen. We apply our findings to the well-known counterexample of Witsenhausen and the Gaussian relay channel problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Team decision theory has been introduced by Marschak [1] to study the behavior of a group of agents who act collectively in a decentralized fashion in order to optimize a common cost function. Radner [2] has established fundamental results for static teams, and in particular, demonstrated connections between person-by-person optimality and team-optimality. Witsenhausen's seminal papers [3] - [8] on dynamic teams and characterization and classification of information structures have been crucial in the progress of our understanding of dynamic teams. Particularly, the well-known counterexample of Witsenhausen [8] demonstrated the challenges that arise due to a decentralized information structure in such models. We refer the reader to [9] for a more comprehensive overview of team decision theory and a detailed literature review.
Establishing the existence of optimal policies is a quite challenging problem in team or decentralized decision theory. In the literature, relatively few results are available on the existence of optimal solutions. Indeed, so far, existence of optimal policies for static teams and a class of sequential dynamic teams have been studied recently in [10] and [11] . In these papers, existence of team optimal policies is established via strategic measure approach where strategic measures are the probability measures induced by policies on the product of state space, observation spaces, and action spaces. In this approach, one first identifies a topology on the set of strategic measures and then proves the compactness of this set along with the lower semicontinuity of the cost function. Then, existence of optimal policy can be deduced via Weierstrass Extreme Value Theorem. However, to establish the compactness of the set of strategic measures, one needs somewhat strong The author is with the Department of Natural and Mathematical Sciences, Ozyegin University, Istanbul 34794, Turkey (e-mail:, naci.saldi@ ozyegin.edu.tr).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TAC.2019.2911798 assumptions on the observation channels (see, e.g., [10, Assumption 3.1] and Remark 2 in this paper). The reason for imposing such a strong condition on the observation channel is that convergence with respect to the topology defined on the set of strategic measures does not in general preserve the information structure of the problem (see, e.g., [11, Th. 2.7] ).
In this paper, we prove the existence of team optimal policies under milder assumptions in comparison with the prior literature [10] , [11] . Unlike strategic measure approach, we introduce a topology on the set of policies, inspired by the topology introduced in [12, Sec. 2.4], instead of the set of strategic measures. In this way, we can preserve the information structure of the problem under the convergence of this topology. Then, since at the heart of all existence results lies Weierstrass Extreme Value Theorem which has two components: lower semicontinuity of the objective and compactness of the feasible region, we prove the lower semicontinuity of the cost function along with the compactness of the set of policies with respect to this topology, under quite mild and easy-to-check conditions.
Although the topology, that we have introduced on the set of policies, seems to be only tailored to the proof of existence of optimal policies due to its abstract nature, we believe that it will be quite useful to further analyze decentralized decision problems in the future. For instance, using this new topology, one can extend the common information approach, which is introduced in [13] to establish dynamic programming algorithm for decentralized decision problems with finite state, action, and observation spaces when common information is present among agents, to Euclidean spaces or more abstract spaces. This is indeed an interesting future research direction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the definition of Witsenhausen's intrinsic model for sequential team problems. In Section III, we prove the existence of team optimal solutions for static team problems. In Section IV, we consider the existence of an optimal policy for dynamic team problems via the static reduction method. In Sections V and VI, we apply the results derived in Section IV to study the existence of optimal policies for Witsenhausen's counterexample and the Gaussian relay channel.
II. INTRINSIC MODEL FOR SEQUENTIAL TEAMS
For a metric space E, let C 0 (E) and C c (E) denote the set of all continuous real functions on E vanishing at infinity and the set of all continuous real functions on E with compact support, respectively. For any g ∈ C c (E), let supp(g) denote its support. Let M(E) and P(E) denote the set of all finite signed measures and probability measures on E, respectively. Let E 1 and E 2 be two metric spaces. For any μ ∈ M(E 1 × E 2 ), we denote by Proj E 1 (μ)( · ) := μ( · × E 2 ) the marginal of μ on E 1 . Let E = N i = 1 E i be a finite product space. For each j, k = 1, . . . , N with k < j, we denote E [ k : j ] = j i = k E i and E −j = i = j E i . A similar convention also applies to elements of these sets which will be denoted by bold lower case letters. For any set D, let D c denote its complement. Unless otherwise specified, the term "'measurable" will refer to Borel measurability in the rest of this paper.
Witsenhausen's intrinsic model [4] for sequential team problems has the following components:
where Borel spaces (i.e., Borel subsets of complete and separable metric spaces) X, U i , and Y i (i = 1, . . . , N ) endowed with Borel σ-algebras denote the state space, and action and observation spaces of Agent i, respectively. Here N is the number of actions taken, and each of these actions is supposed to be taken by an individual agent (hence, an agent with perfect recall can also be regarded as a separate decision maker every time it acts). For each i, the observations and actions of Agent i are denoted by u i and y i , respectively. The Y i -valued observation variable for Agent i is given by
[14, Definition C.1]. A probability measure P on (X, X ) describes the uncertainty on the state variable x.
We note that, the intrinsic model of Witsenhausen gives a settheoretic characterization of information fields, however, for standard Borel spaces, the model above is equivalent to that of Witsenhausen's. Moreover, this model is also equivalent to the noise-driven dynamical system representation of the decentralized control problems that evolves in time (see, e.g., [3] , [5] , [6] ).
A control strategy γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ N ), also called policy, is an N -tuple of measurable functions such that u i = γ i (y i ), where γ i is a measurable function from Y i to U i . Let Γ i denote the set of all admissible policies for Agent i; that is, the set of all measurable functions from Y i to U i and let Γ = k Γ k . Under this intrinsic model, a sequential team problem is dynamic if the information y i available to at least one agent i is affected by the action of at least one other agent k = i. A decentralized problem is static, if the information available at every decision maker is only affected by state of the nature; that is, no other decision maker can affect the information at any given decision maker.
For any γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ N ), we let the (expected) cost of the team problem be defined by
for some measurable cost function c :
where u := (u 1 , . . . , u N ) = γ(y) and y := (y 1 , . . . , y N ).
Definition 1: For a given stochastic team problem, a policy (strategy) γ * := (γ 1 * , . . . , γ N * ) ∈ Γ is an optimal team decision rule if
The cost level J * achieved by this strategy is the optimal team cost.
A. Auxiliary Results
Here, we review some results that will be used in this paper. 
The next result is about convergence of bilinear forms constituting duality between a Banach space and its topological dual.
Proposition 1: Let (E, · ) be a Banach space with its topological dual E * , where the bilinear form that constitutes duality is denoted by e * , e , e ∈ E and e * ∈ E * . Suppose lim n →∞ e n − e = 0 and e * n → e * with respect to w * -topology; that is, lim n →∞ | e * n , e − e * , e | = 0 for all e ∈ E. Then, we have e * n , e n → e * , e as n → ∞.
III. EXISTENCE OF THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR STATIC TEAM PROBLEMS
Since we consider here the static teams, observation channels W i ( · |x) are stochastic kernels on Y i given X. To ease the notation, we define Y :
To prove the existence of team-optimal policies, we enlarge the space of strategies where each agent can also apply randomized strategies; that is, for Agent i, the set of strategies Γ i is defined as
We first prove the existence of optimal randomized strategy. Then, using Blackwell's irrelevant information theorem [15] , we deduce that the optimal strategy can be chosen deterministic which therefore solves the problem for the original setup.
The cost of the team J : Γ → [0, ∞) is given by
where γ(du|y) = N i = 1 γ i (du i |y i ). Here, with an abuse of notation, P (dx, dy) := P (dx) N i = 1 W i (dy i |x) denotes the joint distribution of the state and observations. Therefore, we have J * = inf γ ∈Γ J (γ). For any strategy γ, we let Q γ = γ(du|y)P (dx, dy) denote the probability measure induced on X × Y × U. In the literature, Q γ is called strategic measure. In this section, we impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1:
Remark 1: Note that, for all i = 1, . . . , N , if q i is continuous in x, then Assumption 1(c) holds by [16, Th. 16.2] .
Remark 2: One common approach that is used in the literature [10] , [11] to show the existence of team-optimal policies is the strategic measure approach. In this approach, one first identifies a topology on the set of strategic measures Ξ := {Q γ : γ ∈ Γ} (in general, weak topology) and then proves the relative compactness of Ξ along with lower semicontinuity of the cost function J with respect to this topology. Then, if Ξ is closed with respect to this topology, then one can deduce the existence of an optimal policy via Weierstrass Extreme Value Theorem. The main problem in this approach is to prove the closeness of Ξ, because convergence with respect to the topology defined on Ξ does not in general preserve the statistical independence of the actions given the observations; that is, in the limiting strategic measure, action u i of Agent i may depend on observation y j of Agent j, which is prohibited in the original problem (see, e.g., [11, Th. 2.7] ). For instance, in [10, Assumption 3.1], to prove that Ξ is closed with respect to the weak topology, it is assumed that, for each i = 1, . . . , N , the observation channel W i (dy i |x) and its reverse channel R i (x|y i ) has continuous and bounded densities η i (x, y i ) and ρ i (y i , x), respectively, and these densities satisfy that for any > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that
where h and g are bounded and measurable functions. Here, d X and d Y i are metrics on X and Y i , respectively. As one can see, this condition is much stronger than Assumption 1(c) in view of Remark 1. In this paper, we directly introduce a topology on the set policies Γ instead of the set of strategic measures Ξ. By this way, in the limiting measure, we can preserve the statistical independence of actions given the observations, and therefore, do not need such strong regularity conditions on the observation channels.
A. Topology on the Set of Policies Γ
In this section we introduce a topology on the set of policies Γ, which will be used to obtain the existence of team-optimal policies. To this end, we first identify a topology on Γ i for each i = 1, . . . , N . Fix Then, the map ν → I ν is an isometric isomorphism from M(U i ) to C 0 (U i ) * . Hence, we can identify C 0 (U i ) * with M(U i ).
We now define the set of w * -measurable functions from Y i to M(U i ). Later, we will prove that the set of policies Γ i for Agent i is a bounded subset of this set.
With this definition, we now define the following set:
where ess sup is taken with respect to the measure μ i . Recall that μ i is the reference probability measure in Assumption 1-(d) for the observation channel W i . We now introduce Bochner-integrable functions from Y i to C 0 (U i ), where the topological dual of the set of such functions will shown to be L ∞ μ i , M(U i ) . Similar to the definition of measurable real functions, we first define simple functions. A function f :
Analogous to the definition of the integral of the real simple functions, we define the Bochner integral of f with respect to μ i as
Now, we define strongly measurable functions which are the counterparts of the real measurable functions. A function f :
is said to be strongly measurable, if there exists a sequence {f n } of simple functions with lim n →∞ f n (y) − f (y) ∞ = 0 μ i -almost everywhere. Similar to the definition integrable functions, the strongly measurable function f is said to be Bochner-integrable [19] if
In this case, the integral is given by
where {f n } is the sequence of simple functions which approximates f . Let L 1 μ i , C 0 (U i ) denote the set of all Bochner-integrable functions from Y i to C 0 (U i ) endowed with the norm
Then, we have the following theorem which states that the topological dual of
Then, the map γ → T γ is an isometric isomorphism from
Hence, we can identify
By Theorem 3, we equip L ∞ μ i , M(U i ) with w * -topology induced by L 1 μ i , C 0 (U i ) ; that is, it is the smallest topology on L ∞ μ i , M(U i ) for which the mapping [17] . We write γ n * γ, if γ n converges to γ in L ∞ μ i , M(U i ) with respect to w * -topology. Note that, for this topology, we have been in part inspired by the topology introduced in [12, Sec. 2.4], where in this paper, a similar topology is introduced for randomized Markov policies to study continuous-time stochastic control problems with average cost optimality criterion.
Hence, γ is a stochastic kernel.
Proof: Note first that the mapping Y i y → g, γ(y) ∈ R is measurable for all real, continuous, and bounded g on U i , because any such g can be approximated pointwise by {g n } n ≥1 ⊂ C 0 (U i ) satisfying g n ∞ ≤ g ∞ for all n. Moreover, for any closed set F ⊂ U i , one can approximate pointwise the indicator function 1 F by continuous and bounded functions h n : 
Hence, we can equip Γ i with the relative w * -topology inherited by w * -topology on L ∞ μ i , M(U i ) . Now, we derive couple of properties of this topology on Γ i . First, since P(U i ) is bounded in M(U i ), by Banach-Alaoglu Theorem [17, Th. 5.18] , Γ i is relatively compact with respect to w * -topology. Since C 0 (U i ) is separable, then by [21, Lemma 1.3.2], Γ i is also relatively sequentially compact. However, Γ i is not closed with respect to w * -topology. Indeed, let Y i = U i = R. Define γ n (y i )( · ) := δ n ( · ) and γ(y i )( · ) := 0( · ), where δ n denotes Dirac-delta measure at point n and 0( · ) denotes the degenerate measure on U i ; that is, 0(D) = 0 for all D ∈ B(R). Let g ∈ L 1 μ i , C 0 (U i ) . Then, we have
Hence, γ n * γ. But, γ / ∈ Γ i , and so, Γ i is not closed. In the remainder of this section, Γ i is equipped with this topology. In addition, Γ has the product topology induced by these w * -topologies; that is, γ n converges to γ in Γ with respect to the product topology if and only if γ n ,i * γ i for all i = 1, . . . , N . In this case, we write γ n * γ. Note that Γ is sequentially relatively compact under this topology.
B. Existence of Team-Optimal Policies
In this section, using the topology introduced in Section III-A, we prove the existence of an optimal policy under Assumption 1 and the assumption below. For any L > 0, we define
For each i = 1, . . . , N , we define S i L := Proj Y i ×U i (S L ). In order to prove that Γ L is closed with respect to the w * -topology, we should impose the below assumption. In [10] , condition similar to this assumption is imposed in order to ensure that the set of strategic measures Ξ is relatively compact with respect to the weak topology. However, this condition does not imply that Ξ is closed and, in order to have this, one needs to impose the condition in Remark 2. In our case, we already have relative compactness by definition of the topology and, with below condition, we will also have compactness without any further assumption on the observation channels.
Assumption 2: For some L > 0, S i L is tight for i = 1, . . . , N . Before we continue with the proof, we will give several conditions that imply Assumption 2.
Theorem 4: Suppose either of the following conditions hold: i) U i is compact for all i. ii) For noncompact case, we assume the following: a) The cost function c is in class
, U j ), for all j. b) For all j, q j > 0 and q j is lower semicontinuous. Then, Assumption 2 holds. Proof: i) This is trivial. ii) We definec(x, y, u) := c(x, y, u) N i = 1 q i (y i , x). Since, for all j, q j is lower semicontinuous and strictly greater than 0, for any compact set
, U j ) for j = 1, . . . , N . Then, by Theorem 1, one can inductively prove that Proj X×Y×U [1 :j ] 
But since P (dx) N i μ i (dy i ) is tight, by Theorem 1, Proj X×Y×U 1 (S L ) is also tight. Suppose the assertion is true for j and consider j + 1. Note thatc is in IC(X × Y × U [1 :j ] , U j + 1 ) and
Since Proj The following result states that the cost function J is continuous with respect to the w * -topology, when c is compactly supported continuous function.
Theorem 5: Suppose that γ (n ) * γ as n → ∞ and g ∈ C c (X × Y × U). Then, we have lim n →∞ J g (γ (n ) ) − J g (γ) = 0. where r j ∈ C c (X), f j,i ∈ C c (Y i ), and g j,i ∈ C c (U i ) for each j = 1, . . . , k and i = 1, . . . , N . This implies that it is sufficient to prove the result for functions of the form r N i = 1 f i g i , where r ∈ C c (X), f i ∈ C c (Y i ), and g i ∈ C c (U i ) for i = 1, . . . , N . Therefore, in the sequel, we assume that g = r N i = 1 f i g i .
Let K := supp(r) which is a compact subset of X as r ∈ C c (X). Then, we have
Let us consider the jth term in the above expression. Define the probability measure T −j on X × Y −j × U −j and real function g −j on X × Y −j × U −j as follows:
and g −j := r i = j f i g i . Then, the jth term can be written as
Define, for each x ∈ X, the function b x (y j , u j ) := f j (y j )g j (u j )q j (y j , x).
One can prove that any b x is in L 1 (μ j , C 0 (U j )). We will prove that the set {b x } x ∈K ⊂ L 1 (μ j , C 0 (U j )) is totally bounded. Indeed, let x,x ∈ K. Then,
Since W j is assumed to be continuous with respect to the total variation distance and K is compact, the set {x ∈ K : W j ( · |x)} ⊂ P(Y i ) is compact with respect to the total variation distance. This implies that the set {b x } x ∈K is totally bounded. Using the total boundedness of the set {b x } x ∈K , we prove the following:
Suppose (2) is not true. Then, there exists a subsequence {γ n k j } of {γ n j } such that, for all k, we have
Suppose {ε k } be a sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero. For each k, let x k ∈ K be such that
Since {b x k } is totally bounded, there exists a subsequence {b
Then, by Proposition 1, we have
as γ (n k l ) j * γ j . In addition, we also have b x k l , γ j → b, γ j . Hence,
This contradicts with (4), and so, (2) is true. Note that since we can bound l
the last term converges to zero as n → ∞ by (2) . This implies that J g (γ (n ) ) → J g (γ).
The following theorem is the main result of this section which establishes the existence of team-optimal policies. Theorem 6: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, there exists γ * ∈ Γ which is optimal. Moreover, this strategy can be chosen deterministic; that is, u i = γ i (y i ) for some measurable γ i : Y i → U i , via Blackwell's irrelevant information theorem [9, p. 457] .
Proof: Suppose {γ n } be a minimizing sequence in Γ L ; that is, for each n, we have J (γ n ) < J * + (n), where (n) → 0 as n → ∞. Since Γ is relatively sequentially compact with respect to w * -topology, there exists a subsequence {γ n k } of {γ n } such that γ n k * γ * for some γ ∈ N i = 1 L ∞ μ i , M(U i ) (recall that Γ is not closed with respect to w * -topology). As X × Y × U is locally compact, one can find a sequence of This implies that if γ * i ∈ P(U i ) μ i -a.e. for all i, then γ * is the optimal policy. We now prove γ * i ∈ P(U i ) μ i -a.e. for all i. Fix any i. Note that the sequence {γ n k i ⊗ μ i } is tight as it is a subset of S i L . Thus, there exists a further subsequence, denoted for simplicity by {γ l i ⊗ μ i }, that converges weakly to some λ ∈ P(Y i × U i ). Suppose g ∈ C c (Y i × U i ), and so, g(y i , · ) ∈ L 1 μ i , C 0 (U i ) . Since γ l i * γ * , we have
Similarly, by weak convergence of γ l i ⊗ μ i to λ, we have
This implies that γ * i ⊗ μ i = λ, and so,
e. Thus, γ * is an optimal policy. The existence of deterministic optimal policy can be proved as in the proof of [10, Th. 3.8] and hence, we omit the details.
Remark 3: There are recent works by Kulkarni [23] , [24] that use weak topology in a similar context. In these works, [23, Lemma 4.9 ] and [24, Lemma A.1] can be exploited to prove the existence of optimal policies. Indeed, if one can prove that actions are square integrable under any strategy, the set of actions is weakly relatively compact, and the cost function is lower semicontinuous, then the existence of optimal policies can be deduced by Weierstrass Extreme Value Theorem since [23, Lemma 4.9] and [24, Lemma A.1] guarantees that the limiting actions preserve the information structure of the problem.
IV. EXISTENCE OF THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR DYNAMIC TEAM PROBLEMS
The existence of team-optimal solutions for dynamic team problems can be established by a static reduction method. To this end, we first review the equivalence between dynamic teams and their static reduction (this is called the equivalent model [5] ). Consider a dynamic team setting; that is, for each i = 1, . . . , N , the observation kernel has the form W i ( · |x, u [1 :i −1 ] ). This dynamic team can be converted to a static team provided that the following absolute continuity condition holds. Assumption 3: For every i = 1, . . . , N , there exists a function f i :
Therefore, for a fixed choice of γ, the joint distribution of (x, y) is given by
can then be written as The observations now can be regarded as independent, and by incorporating the f i terms into c, we can obtain an equivalent static team problem. Hence, the essential step is to appropriately adjust the probability space and the cost function.
A. Existence of Team-Optimal Policies
In this section, using Theorem 6 and the static reduction of the dynamic team problems, we prove the existence of an optimal policy. Similar to the static case, we enlarge the space of policies such that agents can apply randomized policies as well.
Analogous to static case, we define, for any L > 0, the following sets:
In addition, for all j, we define
Then, we impose the below assumptions.
Assumption 4: Suppose that Assumption 1-(a), (b) and Assumption 3 hold. In addition, we assume that a) For all i, f i is lower semicontinuous. b) For some L > 0, S i L is tight for i = 1, . . . , N . In [10] , condition similar to the Assumption 4-(b) is imposed to establish that Ξ is relatively compact with respect to the weak topology for dynamic teams admitting static reduction. In order to prove that Ξ is closed, one again needs to impose the condition in Remark 2. However, in our case, we already have relative compactness by definition and, with Assumption 4-(b), we will also have compactness and there is no need for further assumption on the observation channels.
Before we continue with the main theorem of this section, we will give several conditions that imply Assumption 4-(b).
Theorem 7: Suppose either of the following conditions hold: i) U i is compact for all i. ii) For noncompact case, we assume the following:
a) The cost function c is in class
, U j ), for all j. b) For all j, f j > 0. Then, Assumption 4-(b) holds. Proof: i) This is trivial. ii) For each j, we definẽ
Since, for all i, f i is lower semicontinuous and strictly greater than 0, for any compact set
This implies thatc j is also in class
, U j ). Then, by Theorem 1, one can inductively prove that Proj
is tight for all j. Indeed, let j = 1. Then,c 1 is in IC(X × Y 1 , U 1 ) and S L ,1 ⊂ λ ∈ P(X × Y × U) : Proj X×Y (λ)(dx, dy 1 ) = P (dx)ν 1 (dy 1 ) and c 1 dλ ≤ J * + L . is also tight by Theorem 1. Theorem 8: Suppose Assumptions 4 holds. Then, the static reduction of the dynamic team model satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Therefore, by Theorem 6, there exists an optimal strategy for the dynamic team problem.
V. WITSENHAUSEN'S COUNTEREXAMPLE
In Witsenhausen's celebrated counterexample [8] , depicted in Fig. 1 , there are two decision makers: Agent 1 observes a zero mean and unit variance Gaussian random variable y 1 and decides its strategy u 1 . Agent 2 observes y 2 := u 1 + v, where v is standard (zero mean and unit variance) Gaussian noise independent of y 1 , and decides its strategy u 2 .
The cost function of the team is given by
where l ∈ R + . In this decentralized system, the state of the nature x can be regarded as a degenerate (constant) random variable. Let g(y) := 1 √ 2 π exp {−y 2 /2}. Then, we have
where m denotes the Lebesgue measure. Let
so that g(y 2 − u 1 ) = f (u 1 , y 2 ) 1 √ 2 π exp {−(y 2 ) 2 /2}. The static reduction proceeds as follows: for any policy γ, we have J (γ) = c(y 1 , u 1 , u 2 )P (dy 2 |u 1 )δ γ 1 (y 1 ) (du 1 )P g (dy 1 ) = c(y 1 , u 1 , u 2 )f (u 1 , y 2 )P g (dy 2 )P g (dy 1 )
where P g denotes the standard Gaussian distribution. Hence, by definingc(y 1 , y 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) = c(y 1 , u 1 , u 2 )f (u 1 , y 2 ) and P (dy 1 , dy 2 ) = P g (dy 1 )P g (dy 2 ), we can write J (γ) as J (γ) = c(y 1 , y 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) P (dy 1 , dy 2 ).
Therefore, in the static reduction of Witsenhausen's counterexample, the agents observe independent zero mean and unit variance Gaussian random variables.
To tackle the existence problem for Witsenhausen's counterexample, we show that the conditions in Theorem 8 hold.
Theorem 9: Witsenhausen's counterexample satisfies conditions in Theorem 8. Hence, there exists an optimal policy.
Proof: Assumption 1-(a), (b), Assumption 3, and Assumption 4-(a) clearly hold. To prove Assumption 4-(b), we use Theorem 7. Indeed, it is clear that c is both in IC(Y 1 , U 1 ) and in IC(Y 1 × Y 2 × U 1 , U 2 ). Hence, by Theorem 7, Assumption 4-(b) holds.
VI. GAUSSIAN RELAY CHANNEL PROBLEM
An important dynamic team problem which has attracted interest is the Gaussian relay channel problem [26] depicted in Fig. 2 . Here, Agent 1 observes a noisy version of the state x which has Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2
x ; that is, y 1 := x + v 0 where v 0 is a zero mean and variance σ 2 0 Gaussian noise independent of x. Agent 1 decides its strategy u 1 based on y 1 . For i = 2, . . . , N , Agent i receives y i := u i −1 + v i −1 (a noisy version of the decision u i −1 of Agent i − 1), where v i −1 is zero mean and variance σ 2 where l i ∈ R + for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1. To ease the notation, we simply take σ x = σ 0 = σ 1 = · · · = σ N −1 = 1. Recall that g(y) := where P N + 1 g denotes the product of N + 1 zero mean and unit variance Gaussian distributions. Therefore, in the static reduction of Gaussian relay channel, we have the components c(x, y, u) := c(x, u) f (x, y 1 ) N i = 2 f (u i −1 , y i ) and P (dx, dy) = P N + 1 g (dx, dy). Analogous to Witsenhausen's counterexample, the agents observe independent zero mean and unit variance Gaussian random variables.
Theorem 10: The Gaussian relay channel problem satisfies the conditions in Theorem 8. Hence, there exists an optimal policy.
Proof: Assumption 1-(a),(b), Assumption 3, and Assumption 4-(a) clearly hold. To prove Assumption 4-(b), we use Theorem 7. Indeed, it is clear that c is in IC(X × Y , U j ), for all j. Hence, by Theorem 7, Assumption 4-(b) holds.
VII. CONCLUSION
Existence of team-optimal policies for both static and dynamic team problems was considered. Under mild technical conditions, we first showed the existence of an optimal policy for static teams. Using this result, analogous existence results were also established for the dynamic teams via Witsenhausen's static reduction method. Finally, we apply our findings to the well-known counterexample of Witsenhausen and to the Gaussian relay channel.
